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Abstract / Résumé
The paper examines a data set of 338 randomly selected financial
reorganization plans filed in Canada during the period 1978-87. Creditors reject
roughly 25% of reorganization plans, while about 20% of the plans creditors
accept fail before completion, providing evidence of filtering failure in the
reorganization process. A logit model of the creditors reorganization decision
produces two interesting results. Plans offering a high proportion of cash
payments are more likely to be accepted by creditors, which we interpret as
evidence that cash is a signal of financial viability. Plans with high ratios of
secured debt are more likely to be accepted, which we interpret as evidence that
secured creditors with insider knowledge signal information about the financial
viability of firms to unsecured creditors.
Ce document a pour but détudier le processus de réorganisation
financière au Canada sur la base dun échantillon de 338 propositions de
réorganisations commerciales au cours de la période 1978-1987. Les données
démontrent que 25 % des propositions sont rejetées par les créanciers non-garantis
et quenviron 20% des propositions acceptées résultent éventuellement en un échec.
Une analyse du comportement des créanciers lors du vote sur une proposition génère
deux résultats intéressants. Premièrement, la probabilité dacceptation dune
proposition augmente avec la proportion des paiements comptants fait aux
créanciers. Lutilisation de paiements comptants est interprêtée comme un signal
quand à la viabilité dune firme. Deuxièmement, la probabilité dacceptation dune
proposition augmente avec la proportion des créances garanties à lintérieur de la
firme. Ce résultat supporte la thèse à leffet que les banques possèdent de
linformation privilégiée sur la viabilité des entreprises et fournit une nouvelle
évidence quant au rôle des banques dans la transmission de cette information vers
les créanciers non-garantis.
1 Introduction
Bankruptcy laws in most countries, including the U.S., give creditors an im-
portant role in the bankruptcy decision of an insolvent rm. Several recent
papers focus on conicts arising in reorganization and on the importance of
bargaining on the outcome of nancial distress. Brown (1989), Giammarino
(1989), Bebchuk and Chang (1992), Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Gertner
and Scharfstein (1991), White (1994), and Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein
(1994) examine how conicts between the rm and its creditors and between
groups of creditors are resolved through bargaining. Data support the notion
that creditors play a key role in bankruptcy: roughly 90 percent of reorganiza-
tion plans are not conrmed in the U.S. (Flynn, 1989) and, in Canada, about
25 percent of reorganization plans are rejected by creditors (Fisher and Martel,
1994b; Martel, 1994).
This article presents empirical evidence on the role of creditors in nancial
reorganization. There are few empirical studies on court-supervised bankruptcy
and nancial reorganization. Excepting Flynn (1989), the studies have two
common features: a small number of observations and nonrandom samples.
Casey, McGee, and Stickney (1986) and Franks and Torous (1989) examine
only successful Chapter 11 cases, which is clearly not representative of all rms
attempting reorganization. The White (1981, 1984) and the LoPucki (1983)
studies are conned to isolated geographical areas and, as such, their data may
not be representative of all U.S. rms going through Ch. 11.
This study diers from previous ones in two important ways. First, this
article focuses on the behavior of creditors rather than rms. Reorganization is
a two-stage process. At stage 1, the rm chooses between liquidation and reor-
ganization. At stage 2, unsecured creditors vote whether to allow reorganizing
rms to proceed. In our data, stage 1 has already happened; we examine the
determinants of the creditors' stage 2 decision. Second, this study employs a
unique and rich data set not previously available to researchers. Our sample
includes 338 reorganization plans covering the years 1978 to 1987 provided by
the Bankruptcy Branch of the Canadian Department of Industry and Science
(isc), the federal government department responsible for the administration of
Canadian bankruptcy law. Major advantages of the data are: (i) they are ran-
domly selected from the population of commercial reorganization plans led
in Canada, (ii) they are representative of accepted and rejected reorganization
plans, and (iii) there is a relatively large number of events to be analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares Canadian with Amer-
ican bankruptcy law. Although there are dierences in bankruptcy law between
the two countries, there are enough similarities|in particular the role of un-
secured creditors|such that Canadian data can yield important insights into
the bankruptcy process in general. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4
presents key facts from the data. We nd evidence that creditors vote accord-
ing to whether their expected return is higher in liquidation or reorganization.
1
In addition, we nd that the proportion of cash payments oered to creditors
is signicantly higher for rms which successfully reorganize compared to those
which fail. Section 5 discusses results from logit estimation of the incidence
of acceptance of reorganization plans by unsecured creditors. Two interesting
results emerge from the analysis. First, reorganization plans oering relatively
more cash are more likely to be approved by creditors, which we interpret as
evidence that cash is a signal of nancial viability. Second, plans with higher
ratios of secured debt are more likely to be accepted, which we interpret as ev-
idence that secured creditors with insider knowledge signal information about
the nancial viability of rms to unsecured creditors. Section 6 contains some
concluding remarks.
2 Background to Canadian Bankruptcy Law
Before discussing the data, methodology, and results, it is worthwhile to compare
the Canadian Bankruptcy Act with the American Bankruptcy Code.
1
The
basics of bankruptcy are very similar in the two countries. An insolvent rm
seeking the protection of bankruptcy law in Canada has two options: liquidation
(Chapter 7 in the U.S.) or reorganization (Chapter 11 in the U.S.). A rm
choosing reorganization submits a plan to its creditors. The fate of the plan is
decided at a meeting of the creditors. Provided that (i) a majority of unsecured
creditors present at the meeting vote in favor of the plan, and (ii) the claims of
unsecured creditors voting in favor of the plan represent at least 75 percent of
the total claims of the unsecured creditors at the meeting, the plan is deemed
to be accepted.
There are two key dierences between the bankruptcy laws in the two coun-
tries. First, unlike U.S. bankruptcy law, secured creditors are not bound by the
Bankruptcy Act in Canada. A secured creditor in Canada is not subject to a
stay and has the option of liquidating the assets of a debtor (in arrears) at any
time during reorganization. Given that secured creditors are not constrained by
the Bankruptcy Act, one would expect any negative inuence on the reorgani-
zation process by secured creditors, if it exists, to show up clearly in Canadian
data. Second, Canadian law has nothing similar to the `cramdown' procedure
that exists in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The cramdown procedure typically
results in prolonged court proceedings involving competing testimony by expert
witnesses, valuation of a rm's assets by outside appraisers, etc. The courts
are much less likely to become involved in bankruptcy proceedings in Canada,
raising the hope that economic fundamentals, rather than legal maneuvering,
ultimately determine the outcome of the bankruptcy process.
1
A revised Bankruptcy Act came into eect in December 1992. The data set covers the
period 1978{87, i.e., prior to the revisions, so the discussion in this section pertains to the
old Act. For a discussion of the new Act and its implications for bankruptcy see Fisher and
Martel (1994a).
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3 Data
Each reorganization plan made under the Bankruptcy Act is led with one
of the 15 regional bankruptcy oces of isc. The data used in the present
study are taken from these les.
2
We limit attention to the approximately
1,985 commercial reorganization plans led at the largest oces in each of ve
regions of the country (Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, Calgary, and Vancouver)
during the period 1978{87.
3
Using a master-list of le-numbers kept by isc, a
random sample of 499 plans is selected from the 1,985.
4
The sample is chosen
to be `balanced', i.e., the sample is representative of the regional distribution
of plans led each year over the sample period. Because the study focuses on
commercial reorganization plans, consumer plans are omitted from the sample,
reducing the sample by 55 plans to 444.
5
Owing to insucient data and missing
or incomplete les a further 106 les are deleted from the sample. The nal
sample has 338 les, of which 241 were ocially closed and 97 were still active
when the data were collected.
4 Preliminary Analysis
In view of the scarcity of representative data on rms going through nancial
reorganization, we believe there is some value added in presenting stylized facts
from the data. It is worth stressing that these facts originate from the data and
not from casual observation or discussion with bankruptcy practitioners, which
is the approach used by many other studies of bankruptcy.
Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics for the data. Firms attempting
reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act are fairly small, with average assets
of $2.4 million and average liabilities of $4.0 million.
6
Only 13 of the rms in the
sample have publicly traded shares; the remaining 325 rms are privately owned.
As might be expected with nancial data, the variables are highly skewed. For
example, while the mean value of assets is $2.4 million, over 74 percent of the
rms in the sample have total assets of less than $1 million.
Summary statistics for reorganization plans are listed under `Contract vari-
ables'. Reorganizing rms oer an average of 44 cents on the dollar to ordinary
2
For a detailed description of the data set, see Fisher and Martel (1994b).
3
Strictly speaking, 1,985 plans is an upper limit on the number of commercial plans because
the population may include consumer plans or bankruptcies.
4
Random sampling is carried out using the Systematic Random Sampling Procedure.
5
Commercial plans are those with more than 50 percent of total debts represented by
business debts, which is the denition used by isc.
6
All dollar gures in the text are December 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the cpi
deator (Cansim Series Number P484000). To convert these gures to U.S. dollars, the
average noon spot exchange rate in December 1993 was US$1.00=C$1.33 (Cansim Series
Number B3400).
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creditors and have a liquidation value of 29 cents on the dollar.
7
Given the pay-
ment to creditors in the plan, on average, 14 percent is paid in cash up-front,
82 percent in cash installments, and 3 percent in equity.
8
On average, the representative rm has 2.6 secured creditors, 80.4 ordinary
(unsecured) creditors, and 13.6 preferred (unsecured) creditors.
9
About 40 per-
cent of the plans had at least one amendment but no plan has more than three
amendments. The average amount of time between submission of the plan and
the creditors' vote is 52.5 days; 90 percent of the plans were voted on within 3
months of submission.
For the sample as a whole, unsecured creditors accept 259 of the 338 reor-
ganization plans, representing an acceptance rate of 77 percent. Acceptance of
a plan is no guarantee that the rm will complete reorganization: of the 182
closed les that are accepted by creditors, 34 enter bankruptcy before the terms
of the plan are completed, representing a default rate of 19 percent. In fact, for
the 241 closed les, the 59 rejected plans and the 34 defaulted plans imply that
148 plans successfully complete the reorganization process. Therefore, the ex
ante probability that a rm entering the reorganization process will emerge as
an ongoing enterprise is about 61 percent. Two features of reorganization are
thus apparent. First, the rejection rate of 23 percent implies unsecured credi-
tors do not automatically approve the reorganization of insolvent rms. Second,
the default rate of 19 percent indicates there is signicant uncertainty whether
reorganizing rms will actually pay o their creditors.
If the rm is a viable enterprise, then creditors make the correct decision if
they vote to accept a plan from the rm and a Type I error if they vote to reject
the plan. If the rm is not viable, then creditors make the correct decision if
they vote to reject a plan from the rm and a Type II error if they vote to
accept the plan. Of the 182 rms with accepted plans, 34 subsequently enter
liquidation, implying that creditors commit a Type II error in 34 cases. It is not
possible to determine the number of cases where a Type I error is committed,
because it cannot be determined from the data which of the rejected plans were
made by viable rms. However, the possible incidence of Type I errors can be
determined given dierent levels of the incidence of Type II errors together with
the fact that 59 plans are rejected. Table 2 presents possible scenarios for the
incidence of Type I and Type II errors.
10
Table 2 shows that the incidence of
7
Gross liquidation value is dened as total assets minus secured and preferred claims. The
liquidation value is the gross liquidation value divided by ordinary claims.
8
Up-front payments are dened as cash paid within one month of the date the bankruptcy
court approves the plan. Installments are dened as cash payments more than one month
after the court approval date.
9
Preferred creditors have roughly the same status as `priority' creditors under the American
Bankruptcy Code. Examples of preferred creditors are federal and provincial governments,
employees, and landlords.
10
Table 2 is determined as follows. If all 59 rejected plans are from nonviable rms, i.e.,
creditors always make the correct rejection decision, then the incidence of Type I errors is
zero and the incidence of Type II errors is 34=(34+ 59)  :366, giving the rst row. If 57 of
4
Type II errors is no less than 36 percent, and is at least four times the incidence
of Type I errors at condence levels of 5 percent or 10 percent for the creditors'
decision. According to White (1994) `ltering failure' occurs in the bankruptcy
process when Type I and II errors are committed by creditors. The overall
incidence of ltering failure in the data is between 14.0 percent (34/241) and
38.6 percent (93/241).
Another important set of stylized facts about the reorganization process
concerns the type of contract oered by rms to their creditors. According to
White (1994), rms use the reorganization payo rate to signal nancial vi-
ability to creditors. Martel (1994) assumes that the probability of successful
reorganization depends positively on the amount of cash available at the time
of reorganization. Because reorganizing rms are typically cash constrained and
face credit rationing from the bank, less viable rms will have more diculty
raising cash to compensate creditors. Assuming there is asymmetric informa-
tion with respect to the rm's nancial viability, rms can use cash payments
to signal their type to uninformed creditors. In equilibrium, cash payments are
used by viable rms to separate themselves from non-viable rms. Martel (1994)
also shows that the expected liquidation return, which represents the opportu-
nity cost of reorganization to creditors, aects the creditors' decision. Table 3
sheds some light on the role of the reorganization return, cash payments, and
the liquidation return.
Table 3 displays three potentially important facts. First, the liquidation pay-
o rate exceeds the reorganization payo rate for rejected plans and vice versa
for accepted plans.
11
Second, accepted plans have higher reorganization payo
rates than rejected plans.
12
These facts are consistent with creditors voting ac-
cording to whether the (expected) payo rate is greater under reorganization or
liquidation. Third, looking only at accepted plans, cash payments for successful,
i.e., completed, plans are more than seven times higher than cash payments for
plans that defaulted.
13
This is consistent with high cash payments signalling
rms that are more likely to reorganize successfully. Signalling is also supported
by the fact that the reorganization payo rate for accepted-completed plans is
lower than the payo rate for accepted-defaulted plans. Creditors were willing
to accept a lower payo rate from accepted-completed plans because the higher
cash payments signalled a higher probability that these plans would actually
the 59 rejected plans were from nonviable rms, then 2 rejected plans were made by viable
rms, the incidence of Type I errors is 2=(2+ 148) :013 and the incidence of Type II errors
is 34=(34 + 57)  :374, giving the second row. The rest of the table is determined the same
way.
11
A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean liquidation payo rate is greater (less) than
the mean reorganization payo rate has critical value of 0.16 (4.74) and a p-value of 0.44
(2:27 10
 6
) for rejected (accepted) plans.
12
A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean reorganization payo rate is greater for accepted
plans than it is for rejected plans has critical value of 1.11 and a p-value of 0.14.
13
A t-test of the hypothesis that the mean cash payo rate is greater for completed plans
than for defaulted plans has critical value of 5.24 and a p-value of 3:16 10
 6
.
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succeed.
To summarize, First, the existence of ltering failure indicates that creditors
face signicant uncertainty when deciding whether to allow rms to proceed
with reorganization. Second, the data suggest that reorganization depends on
the payo rate creditors expect to receive in reorganization versus liquidation.
Third, the nature of the reorganization contract, in particular the amount of
cash payments made to creditors, also seems to play a role in the process.
5 Parametric Analysis of Creditor Voting
By voting to reject roughly one-quarter of reorganization plans, unsecured cred-
itors clearly play a critical role in bankruptcy reorganization. But what factors
inuence how creditors vote? Preliminary analysis suggests that reorganization
and liquidation payo rates to unsecured creditors are probably important de-
terminants of the creditors' decision. To investigate whether this is the case, we
estimate the impact of payo rates on the outcome of the unsecured creditors
vote whether to approve a reorganization plan. Other questions about reor-
ganization can also be analyzed within this framework. For example, we may
investigate the impact of secured creditors, the impact of legal restrictions, and
the impact of bargaining between debtor and creditors.
5.1 Model specication
The dependent variable takes only the discrete values of unity (if the plan is
accepted by the creditors) and zero (otherwise). Given the dichotomous nature
of the dependent variable, the acceptance incidence equation is estimated by
logit analysis.
14
Strictly speaking, the vote represents the joint eect of many
individual decisions. For tractability, we assume that creditors act as a coalition.
Following the preliminary analysis, assume that creditors compare the ex-
pected payo rate from the reorganization plan to the expected payo rate
from liquidation and vote for the option with the higher payo rate. Prelim-
inary analysis also suggested that the amount of cash the rm oers as part
of the plan may be an important element of the creditors' decision. Thus, the
contract variables|the reorganization payo rate, the liquidation payo rate,
and the ratio of cash payments to total payments|model the impact of the
plan on the outcome of the unsecured creditors vote.
Theoretical models of bankruptcy (Bulow and Shoven, 1978; White, 1981,
1989) assume that secured creditors favor liquidation over reorganization. Fur-
thermore, in Canada, secured creditors have the power to terminate reorganiza-
tion because they are not constrained by bankruptcy law. Clearly, an important
14
See Maddala (1983). Estimation is performed using Version 7.0 of SHAZAM (White,
1988).
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issue facing unsecured creditors is whether secured creditors will choose to ex-
ercise their power over a rm attempting reorganization. One possibility is that
rms with relatively high levels of secured debt may be more at risk from liqui-
dation by secured creditors. To determine the inuence of secured creditors on
the vote by unsecured creditors, the ratio of secured claims to total liabilities is
added to the logit model.
According to White (1981) insolvent rms with large numbers of ordinary
creditors are much more likely to reorganize than insolvent rms with a small
number of ordinary creditors. The existence of extreme values in the sample
makes it problematic to implement empirically a variable capturing this eect.
To mitigate the impact of extreme values we use the ratio of ordinary creditors
to the total number of creditors as an explanatory variable.
Full repayment of preferred claims is mandatory for the approval of nancial
reorganization in Canada. The mandatory repayment of preferred claims may
impose a burden on the cash-ow of reorganizing rms. In addition, federal and
provincial government, or Crown, claims, which are almost always the largest
component of preferred claims,
15
are viewed by many bankruptcy practitioners
to be a signicant impediment to reorganization. To control for this eect, the
ratio of Crown claims to total liabilities is added to the model.
An eciency concern about the bankruptcy process is it allows unprotable
rms to `buy time' and extend their lives at the expense of their creditors. To
examine the eect of delays, the time between ling and voting is added to the
list of explanatory variables. As a proxy for willingness to negotiate on the
part of the debtor, we add a variable measuring the number of amendments
to the plan. To control for the inuence of the business cycle, the change in
unemployment rate over the quarter before the date of the creditors' vote is also
added to the model. We also control for the following xed eects: a dummy
variable for corporations|to control for dierences between corporate plans
and those made by individuals|4 regional dummy variables (Toronto is the
excluded region), 10 year dummy variables, and 4 industry dummy variables.
Owing to incomplete information, 55 so-called holding plans are deleted from
the sample reducing the sample size to 283 plans for the logit analysis. Holding
plans are submitted by rms requiring more time to prepare complete proposals.
Because they are essentially interim documents, important data for the logit
analysis|such as the distribution of claims against the rm and information
about payo rates to creditors|are frequently missing from holding plans.
16
The data set is generated by rms that have chosen reorganization over liqui-
dation, raising the possibility that estimates are subject to self-selection bias.
17
15
Crown claims account for the majority of preferred claims in 82 percent of the plans with
preferred claims.
16
In cases where the payo rate and the proportion of cash payments are unknown they have
been set to zero on the grounds that creditors assume the worst in the absence of information
to the contrary.
17
Of course, preceding the bankruptcy decision, there is another type of self-selection when
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In principle, it is possible to correct for the selectivity bias given data on the
variables that determine rms' choice between liquidation and reorganization.
However, given the absence of an accepted theoretical model of the bankruptcy
decision and, in any case, the likelihood that our data do not cover all the rele-
vant variables, we do not control for self-selection bias in the estimates below.
5.2 Estimation results
Table 4 contains the results from logit estimation. The three key variables
modeling the creditors decision are individually signicant at the .05 level. A
higher liquidation payo rate implies a lower acceptance rate, a higher reorga-
nization payo rate implies a higher acceptance rate, and a higher proportion of
cash payments implies a higher acceptance rate, ceteris paribus. These results
conrm the story in Table 3. As expected, the reorganization payo rate is
important. The type of contract oered to creditors also plays a key role in
reorganization, supporting the hypothesis that asymmetric information induces
rms to use cash payments to signal their viability to uninformed creditors.
With symmetric information, the rm's investment decision is independent of
its choice of nancing (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), implying than an insolvent
rm is indierent between cash and deferred payments. The cash payments
result indicates that the rm's reorganization decision is not independent of
its nancing decision. This is consistent with Myers and Majluf (1984) where
asymmetric information aects the type of nancing used by rms and induces a
`pecking order' in the sources of nancing such that rms resort rst to internal
nancing, then to low-risk debt, and nally to equity.
18
Plans made by rms with a relatively large amount of secured claims are
signicantly more likely to be accepted. This apparently contradicts the view
that secured creditors hinder reorganization. According to Gilson, John, and
Lang (1990), private reorganization is more likely to succeed in rms owing
relatively more debt to banks because the holdout problem is mitigated. Our
result also indicates that reorganization is more likely to succeed in rms with
relatively more bank debt but it probably is related to the veto power that
secured creditors enjoy under Canadian bankruptcy law. It is well known in
common value auctions that bidders can update their valuations by observing
the actions of other bidders. In the context of reorganization, unsecured credi-
tors may watch the behavior of secured creditors when evaluating the prospects
of a reorganizing rm. A decision by a secured creditor to support a plan, by not
liquidating its assets in the rm, may thus be interpreted by unsecured creditors
as a signal to support the plan. This eect will only be reinforced if it is known
insolvent rms choose to resolve their nancial diculties under the protection of bankruptcy
law rather than trying an informal arrangement.
18
See Harris and Raviv (1991) for a survey of the literature on how asymmetric information
aects the nancing decisions of rms.
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that secured creditors have inside information about the rm.
19
In fact, Fama
(1985) argues that banks play an important role as transmitters of information
in capital markets because of their access to private information about rms
arising from ongoing business relationships. In support of Fama (1985), James
(1987) nds that banks provide a service with their lending activity that is not
available from other types of lenders and Lummer and McConnell (1989) nd
that favorable loan revisions by banks result in signicantly positive excess stock
returns for borrowers around the loan announcement.
Plans made by rms with a relatively large number of ordinary creditors
are signicantly more likely to be accepted. This result seems paradoxical since
one would expect that higher numbers of ordinary creditors make agreement
on a plan more dicult, everything else being equal. Below, we investigate the
possibility that the signalling eect of the size of secured claims is related to the
relative number of ordinary creditors.
Plans with relatively large Crown claims are less likely to be accepted, which
is consistent with the view that the statutory nature of Crown claims hinders
successful reorganization by raising the burden on the rm's cash ow. The
eect is statistically signicant at the .10 level.
The more time between ling and voting, the lower the probability that
unsecured creditors vote in favor of the plan. The time spent in reorganization
is costly because it disrupts the rm's normal activities. Clearly, the opportunity
cost of time is higher to viable rms. Thus, delays may convey information to
creditors about the rm's viability. This suggests that rms attempting to `buy
time' will be unsuccessful. Another explanation is that in some cases agreement
is hard to reach, leading to delays and eventually rejection. Note, however, that
the logit regression controls for the presence of bargaining through the number
of amendments variable. The more amendments to the plan, the more likely
the plan is accepted. Thus, rms that take a long time to reorganize and do
not bargain with their creditors, as represented by the amendments variable,
are much less likely to have plans accepted, which is consistent with the `buy
time' argument.
Because the unemployment rate variable has a negative and insignicant
coecient, there is weak evidence that acceptance probabilities are procyclical.
20
Corporate plans are not estimated to have signicantly dierent acceptance
probabilities than non-corporate plans.
To give an idea of the robustness of the results, Table 5 presents results
from alternative specications of the model. Column (1) reproduces the re-
sults from Table 4 for comparison. A likelihood ratio test to determine the
19
Unsecured creditors have an incentive to vote in favour of plans with high ratios of secured
claims even if there is no signalling eect because high secured claims imply low liquidation
values. This eect has been taken into account as liquidationvalue (net of secured claims|see
footnote 7) is an independent variable in the logit regression.
20
Replacing the national unemployment rate with regional unemployment rates produced
an even less signicant impact.
9
joint signicance of the contract variables clearly rejects the hypothesis that the
characteristics of the reorganization plan have no eect on the probability that
the plan is accepted by creditors. The column (2) estimates replace the Crown
claims variable with the ratio of preferred claims to total liabilities. The other
coecients hardly change and the coecient on the preferred claims variable
is not statistically signicant. Thus, there is weak evidence that it is Crown
claims and not preferred claims, of which Crown claims are a subset, that have
a negative impact on the acceptance rate.
Column (3) investigates the secured claims signalling story. Small creditors
have little incentive to gather information on the future viability of the rm.
Thus, rms with large numbers of ordinary creditors will probably have rela-
tively low numbers of informed creditors, implying that the signalling eect of
secured claims will be that much more pronounced. To investigate this pos-
sibility, the ordinary creditor and secured claims variables are replaced by an
interaction term, which is simply the product of the two variables.
21
The higher
the value of the interaction term, the greater the potential for secured claims
to act as signal because it represents cases where secured claims are relatively
high and ordinary creditors are a relatively large group. The coecient on the
interaction term is statistically signicant at the .10 level and positive, which
is consistent with the signalling story. Note also that the coecients on the
contract variables are largely unaected by the change in specication.
Column (4) shows the estimates when the control variables for year, region,
and industry are deleted from the list of explanatory variables. The pseudo-R
2
falls by almost 30 percent from the base model, indicating that a fair degree of
the `t' in the model is due to the control variables. Nonetheless, the signicance
of the other variables in the model is not appreciably altered. In particular, joint
insignicance of the contract variables is easily rejected at conventional levels
of signicance, echoing other results in the table.
6 Conclusion
The paper has presented a unique data set on rms undergoing nancial reorga-
nization in Canada over the period 1978{87. We have presented ample evidence
in this paper showing that there is indeed negotiation between the rm and its
creditors after the rm has decided to proceed with reorganization.
What do the results suggest about bankruptcy theory? First, the reorgani-
zation process is more complex than the recent model of White (1994) suggests.
To be sure, the rate of return oered to unsecured creditors in a rm's reorgani-
zation plan is an important inducement for creditors to favor the plan. But the
data also indicate that the liquidation return to unsecured creditors, i.e., the
opportunity cost of nancial reorganization to the creditors, is also an impor-
tant variable in the reorganization process. Moreover, the rate of up-front cash
21
The product is multiplied by .01 to give the interaction term a range of zero to 100.
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payments by the rm also has a signicant on the process, supporting the Mar-
tel (1994) claim that signalling is an important element of the process. That
the nature of the contract itself is an important factor in the reorganization
process is a genuinely new empirical nding and warrants further theoretical
investigation.
Second, secured creditors seem to play an additional role to that suggested
in Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1981, 1989). In these models, se-
cured creditors prefer liquidation over reorganization. In our data, however, we
nd that unsecured creditors are more likely to favor reorganization in rms
which have relatively higher rates of secured debt. One interpretation is that
secured creditors play a role in screening viable rms from nonviable rms. Of
course, this is not necessarily inconsistent with the Bulow-Shoven-White view.
It is quite possible that secured creditors have a negative eect on the number
of rms choosing reorganization while strongly backing a few rms that they
would like to see restructured. In other words, to completely understand the
aect of secured creditors on reorganization, one would need to determine the
impact of secured creditors on the number of rms choosing reorganization over
liquidation.
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Table 1 | Descriptive Statistics for Reorganization Plans, Canada, 1978{87.
Variable Mean Median Standard Minimum Maximum
deviation
Financial variables:
a
Total assets 2,372.1 299.6 10,955.0 0.0 122,100.0
Total liabilities 3,971.7 791.6 18,228.0 16.0 247,620.0
Secured claims 1,890.5 222.3 11,920.0 0.0 189,460.0
Ordinary claims 1,324.7 342.8 6,185.5 0.0 92,852.0
Preferred claims 96.1 17.9 337.3 0.0 4,415.2
Contract variables:
b
Liquidation payo rate 28.7 10.3 35.3 0.0 100.0
Reorganization payo rate
c
43.6 32.3 33.5 0.0 101.0
Proportion of payments in cash
d
14.3 0.0 31.7 0.0 100.0
Proportion of payments by installment 82.2 100.0 35.4 0.0 100.0
Proportion of payments in equity 3.4 0.0 17.8 0.0 100.0
Other variables:
Number of secured creditors 2.6 2.0 3.7 0.0 42.0
Number of ordinary creditors 80.4 41.0 173.0 0.0 2,487.0
Number of preferred creditors 13.6 2.0 55.8 0.0 827.0
Number of amendments 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.0 3.0
Number of days between ling and voting 52.5 24.0 113.6 11.0 1,682.0
Notes: The sample size is 338 plans. The acceptance rate is 76.6 percent (259 of 338).
a
Reported in thousands of December 1993 Canadian dollars, deated by the cpi.
b
Reported in percent.
c
Based on the 284 plans for which the information is available.
d
The proportion of payments variables are based on the 279 plans for which information is available.
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Table 2 | Possible Incidence of Type I and Type II Errors
in the Creditors' Decision.
Number of rejected plans Incidence of Incidence of
Type I errors Type II errors
from viable rms from nonviable rms (percent) (percent)
0 59 0.0 36.6
2 57 1.3 37.4
8 51 5.1 40.0
16 43 9.8 44.2
37 22 20.0 60.7
59 0 28.5 100.0
Table 3 | Payoff Rates and Cash Payments under
Liquidation and Reorganization.
Accepted plans Rejected plans
Completed Defaulted
Liquidation payo rate 24.5 30.2 38.3
Reorganization payo rate 39.9 52.9 37.2
Proportion of payments in cash 19.0 2.5 12.1
Number of plans 129 39 52
Note: Based on 220 completed plans where the information is available. Payo rates and
proportions are reported in percent.
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Table 4 | Logit Estimates of the Probability of Acceptance.
Explanatory variable
a
Mean Logit Change in Asymptotic
coecient probability
b
t-statistic
c
Contract variables:
Liquidation payo rate 27.179  .0161  .27 2.46

Reorganization payo rate 39.452 .0154 .25 2.21

Ratio of cash payments to total payments 12.933 .0190 .31 2.30

Plan-specic variables:
Ratio of ordinary creditors to total creditors 80.878 .0235 .39 2.04

Ratio of secured claims to total liabilities 33.558 .0166 .27 1.96

Ratio of Crown claims to total liabilities 4.030  .0418  .69 1.90

Number of days between ling and voting 38.700  .0102  .17 3.34

Number of amendments .385 2.6522 43.77 4.25

Other variables:
Unemployment rate change over previous quarter .009  .9363  15.45 1.41
Corporations
d
64.311 .6532 8.79 1.32
Notes: The sample size is 283 plans. The acceptance rate is 79.2 percent (224 of 283).
The estimated model includes a constant term and controls for year (10), industry (4), and
region (4).
a
The payo rates and all ratio variables are measured in percent.
b
Change in the percentage probability of acceptance in response to a unit change in the
corresponding explanatory variable evaluated at the mean acceptance probability of 79.2
percent.
c
Absolute values of t-statistics are reported.
d
Mean is the percentage of plans submitted by incorporated rms.

Statistically signicant at the .05 level.

Statistically signicant at the .10 level.
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Table 5 | Alternative Logit Estimates of the Probability of Acceptance.
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Contract variables:
Liquidation payo rate  0.0161

 0.0162

 0.0170

 0.0164

(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0055)
Reorganization payo rate 0.0154

0.0149

0.0172

0.0115

(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0061)
Ratio of cash payments to total payments 0.0190

0.0195

0.0172

0.0094
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0078) (0.0063)
Plan-specic variables:
Ratio of ordinary creditors to total creditors 0.0235

0.0242

{ 0.0260

(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0099)
Ratio of secured claims to total liabilities 0.0166

0.0175

{ 0.0168

(0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0073)
Ordinary creditors-secured claims interaction term { { 0.0178

{
(0.0107)
Ratio of Crown claims to total liabilities  0.0418

{  0.0466

 0.0204
(0.0220) (0.0219) (0.0193)
Ratio of preferred claims to total liabilities {  0.0221 { {
(0.0184)
Number of days between ling and voting  0.0102

 0.0101

 0.0105

 0.0067

(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0027)
Number of amendments 2.6522

2.5904

2.6999

2.1965

(0.6236) (0.6107) (0.6250) (0.5327)
Other variables:
Unemployment rate change over previous quarter  0.9363  0.9356  0.8279  0.3396
(0.6637) (0.6614) (0.6508) (0.3172)
Corporations 0.6532 0.6662 0.7510 0.2745
(0.4954) (0.4927) (0.4843) (0.3721)
Controls (number of variables):
Year (10), Industry (4), Region (4) yes yes yes no
Likelihood ratio test for contract variables
a
13.82 14.02 14.81 11.93
[0.00317] [0.00288] [0.00199] [0.00763]
Pseudo R
2;b
.26 .25 .25 .18
Log likelihood  102.89  104.09  104.80  115.99
Notes: Sample size is 283. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All estimated equations
include a constant term.
a
Likelihood ratio test for the joint signicance of the contract variables. Probability values are
reported in brackets.
b
Maddala (1983), eq.(2.44), p.39.

Statistically signicant at the .05 level.

Statistically signicant at the .10 level.
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